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Abstract: This honors thesis examines how individuals displaced by gentrification fare 
after relocation, with changes in wage and income as the primary measures of well-being. 
Geo-coded Panel Study of Income Dynamics data is used in conjunction with decennial 
census tract-level neighborhood data to evaluate nationwide occurrences of gentrification 
and their effects on the displaced between 1990 and 1995, with a focus on whether 
changing neighborhood effects can account for the change in well-being. Standard OLS 
regressions not accounting for neighborhood effects find that compared to a nationwide 
sample, a sample of movers, and a sample of displaced residents, residents displaced 
specifically by gentrification do not experience statistically significant wage or income 
changes. When neighborhood effects are considered, being displaced by gentrification 
has varying effects on wage and income, and changes in wage and income, which vary 
based on which neighborhood characteristic is being considered. These effects vary 
greatly in their consistency with neighborhood effects theory, suggesting that analysis 
would benefit greatly from improved data. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Gentrification—the buying and renovation of houses and stores in deteriorated 
urban neighborhoods by upper or middle income families or individuals, which improves 
property values but often displaces low income families and small businesses—has been 
an increasingly common urban phenomenon since the 1950s, and yet very few studies 
have empirically tested what happens to those residents who are displaced by this process 
in the long run.  
According to George and Eunice Grier, 
 
Displacement occurs when any household is forced to move from its 
residence by conditions which affect the dwelling or its immediate 
surroundings, and which: 
(1) are beyond the household’s reasonable ability to control or 
 prevent; 
(2) occur despite the household’s having met all previously-imposed 
 conditions of occupancy; and 
(3) make continued occupancy by that household impossible, 
 hazardous, or unaffordable (HUD, in Le Gates and Hartman, 1981, 
 p. 214). 
 
Past research finds that white professionals and single parents move into 
gentrifying neighborhoods, as working class residents, the elderly, the unskilled, and the 
unemployed are displaced (Atkinson 2000). While it is mostly low-income households 
that are displaced, there are also a significant number of middle-class people that leave 
the neighborhood (Lyons 1996). Yet many aspects of what happens to this highly diverse 
but economically disadvantaged group remain unanswered. 
This study uses geo-coded Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, as have 
several previous displacement studies. It also explicitly links displacement with 
gentrification to look at cities around the United States, rather than only at a particular 
instance or instances of gentrification, and extends from 1990 to 1995. It examines how 
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individuals’ wages and incomes change as they relocate from gentrifying neighborhoods 
to new ones to measure whether individuals end up better or worse off. The study 
attempts to answer why the incomes or wages of individuals change as they relocate. Is a 
significant difference between past and present neighborhood effects—such as a 
difference in potential role models or a difference in unemployment rates—responsible 
for the changes in individual wage and income? While this is an issue that has been 
addressed in previous literature, it has oft been left to the discretion of the residents 
surveyed to rank their neighborhoods, whereas this study will use decennial census data 
to evaluate neighborhoods. 
Section II will review literature on neighborhood effects and displacement. 
Section III will provide a theoretical framework and estimation strategy. Section IV will 
discuss the data and the variable specification. Section V will report regression results 
and robustness checks. Section VI will discuss conclusions drawn from findings. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. What are Neighborhood Effects?  
To understand whether the displaced end up better or worse off, one must 
understand what changes occur to them when they relocate out of their gentrifying 
neighborhoods. Most obviously, their neighborhoods change. While different 
neighborhoods offer a bevy of varying combinations of public transportation, housing, 
and educational institutions, it must be remembered that gentrification as it is considered 
in this paper is a purely urban phenomenon. Recent research has shown that a wave of 
gentrification known as postrecessionary gentrification has been occurring since the 
period after the recession of the early 1990s and spreading to areas away from the urban 
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cores of cities (Niedt 2006). However, this study only covers up to 1995, and will not 
consider suburbs as susceptible to gentrification. Thus, because they are located in the 
city center, a person encountering gentrification should have enough public transportation 
options, as most cities do, so that having more educational or other institutions in their 
immediate neighborhood should not significantly affect them. That is, it is easy for a 
person living in a city to go to another neighborhood in the city for work, school, etc. In 
this sense, it may be the difference in neighbors that is the biggest difference for people 
displaced by gentrification. This concept is known as neighborhood effects, and it speaks 
to the myriad ways in which neighbors influence each other’s behavior (Freeman 2006; 
Lees 2008; Wilson 1987).  
While this paper focuses on neighborhood effects, it cannot be ignored that 
gentrification can have many other effects on displaced residents. Gentrification carries a 
large psychic cost, especially for those residents who come from very insular 
neighborhoods. Losing one’s neighbors, close-by relatives, etc. can be traumatic, and this 
can cause a displaced family to incur costs it had not experienced before, either because 
of emotional trauma, or because of, for example, the necessity to hire a babysitter when 
one was readily available at no or lower cost before. Gentrification can also cause 
displaced residents to feel inept or wronged, and thus cynical towards gentrifying forces. 
Doubtless, there are many other sources of possible effects of gentrification that will not 
be discussed in this paper, which will focus solely on neighborhood effects as possible 
reasons for changes in residents’ well being.  
Neighborhood effects can be divided into four categories: peer effects, collective 
efficacy/socialization, social ties, and institutional resources.   
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Peer effects refers to the idea that like follows like and individuals will be 
influenced by the behavior of their peers. This is most often used to refer to people 
witnessing, reacting to, and taking on the behavior of individuals within their own age 
group. Collective efficacy and collective socialization refer to when the collective actions 
of the neighborhood are directed at the behavior of local residents or externally, 
respectively. An example of collective efficacy is the idea of role models for children. 
The idea is that children need positive role models and adjusting to the change in local 
behavioral pathologies can affect a resident’s life (Wyly 1999). Social ties are those 
connections that are sources of social satisfaction, and may also facilitate upward 
mobility by providing sources of information about jobs (Kleit 2001). The mixing of 
cultures and races is supposedly preferable over a homogenous setting, as it prepares 
children for the many cultures that they are likely to encounter as adults, and expands the 
horizons of older residents (Allen 1984). Finally, institutional resources refers to the 
influence that the upper-classes have with organizations and the ability of the upper-
classes to create effective community organizations.  
B. Past Research in a Neighborhood Effects Framework 
Lyons finds that higher-income movers in Greater London were more likely to 
move farther away to find neighborhoods that were suitable to their needs, while lower-
income residents were more likely to remain near the central city though further away 
from it than they were in their former neighborhood. Schill and Nathan (1983) have 
similar findings when they study the displaced in five gentrifying areas in the United 
States. They find that 22 percent of the displaced had shorter commutes after being 
displaced, and only 15 percent traveled longer distances. Furthermore, very few of the 
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displaced relocated away from the city, as only 8 percent of the displaced moved to the 
city’s suburbs or away from the metropolitan area, as compared to 17 percent of 
voluntary movers (Schill and Nathan 1983). That the displaced remain in the central city 
or close to their place of work supports the assumption that they have sufficient means of 
transportation to get to school and work, and should not have to rely upon their new 
neighborhoods for work or education opportunities within the neighborhood’s 
parameters.  
Lower-income residents in London were also more likely to live in enclaves, 
meaning that many of the lower-income displaced from one neighborhood were likely to 
relocate to the same neighborhood (Lyons 1996). This suggests that they are likely to 
maintain the same social ties, which would hinder absorption of the effects of their new 
neighborhoods or new neighborhood effects in their gentrifying neighborhoods (HUD 
1981). One state-sponsored gentrification program in Copenhagen was meant not to 
displace any residents, but to involve them in the revitalization of the neighborhood, but 
still ended with some residents moving to purportedly “worse” neighborhoods (Larsen 
2008). Dixon (1998) states that long-term residents of the Cabrini-Green houses in 
Chicago have been forced to move into more substandard homes as they are displaced by 
gentrification, but fails to cite the source of this information. In these aforementioned 
cases, the displaced are encountering negative neighborhood effects, as they are either 
ending up in worse neighborhoods or maintaining connections with other low-income 
residents from their original neighborhood. However, it cannot be said that gentrification 
caused those who stayed in their original neighborhoods to experience negative effects.  
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Two studies focusing on minority migration patterns evaluate mobility between 
high-income and low-income neighborhoods. They find that white households are 
typically much less likely to move from high-income to low-income neighborhoods than 
minority households are, though the rate of this sort of movement for white households 
has increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s (Crowder and South 2005; South, 
Crowder, and Chavez 2005).  Though their studies do not explicitly link mobility with 
displacement from gentrification, they speculate that this increased trend in downward 
mobility may be a reflection of gentrification. This would seem to support the displaced 
ending up worse off in terms of neighborhood effects, as the data find that minority 
residents are likely to relocate to worse neighborhoods, though it is uncertain whether 
low-income residents would be moving to even lower-income neighborhoods. 
Freeman studies gentrifying neighborhoods in New York City and finds that low-
income individuals and individuals without a college degree are less likely to move out of 
a gentrifying neighborhood than similar individuals in a non-gentrifying neighborhood 
(Freeman 2005).1 Similarly, a study of five gentrifying neighborhoods found that over 70 
percent of the displaced households, compared to 60 percent of the voluntary movers, 
relocated within the same zip code or to a neighboring zip code, suggesting that they 
remain in close proximity to gentrification (Schill and Nathan 1983). This may point to 
the displaced still being in close enough proximity to garner some positive neighborhood 
effects from in-movers (Vigdor 2001). But while Freeman’s econometric analysis 
supports the idea that low-income residents do not end up worse off because they are 
                                                
1 Generalizations about gentrification in the United States should not be made based on cases of 
gentrification in New York. New York is a special case in that very few alternative affordable housing 
options exist, so there may be less of an option to move or benefit to be gained for long-term residents if 
they choose to relocate out of their gentrifying neighborhood. 
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more likely to make intra-neighborhood moves or remain in their original housing than 
be displaced, interviews with long-term residents suggest that there is no or very little 
social mixing, so that residents cannot benefit from the positive neighborhood effects that 
upper-class gentrifiers bring (Freeman 2005).  As Freeman says, “Income mixing is no 
promise of upward mobility” (Freeman 2006, p. 206).  
A U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development report (1981) which used 
PSID and survey data finds that displaced residents from the San Francisco Hayes Valley 
neighborhood did not experience “severe negative changes in housing characteristics 
either absolutely or in comparison with other groups.” The Hayes Valley study also states 
that displaced households were more satisfied with their homes and neighborhoods after 
moving, which could be a product of positive neighborhood effects within their 
neighborhood (HUD 1981). Another HUD study that used PSID data found less 
favorable outcomes for displaced residents, but did not link displacement directly with 
gentrification (Vigdor 2002). It found that displaced households are likely to experience 
significant increases in crowding and housing cost burden, but that displacement did not 
significantly affect housing costs, welfare dependency, or hours worked.  
Somewhat contradictory to the aforementioned findings, Schill and Nathan’s 
(1983) study of five gentrifying areas in the United States found that though rent 
increased (but only moderately) for many displaced residents, these residents must have 
been purchasing additional rooms with the additional rent, as crowding did not 
significantly increase. This study also found that 56 percent of displaced residents rated 
their new neighborhood as better than the one they were displaced from, whereas 67 
percent of voluntary movers found their new neighborhood better than their old one. 
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Nineteen percent of the displaced reported that their new neighborhood was worse than 
their previous neighborhood, whereas 13 percent of voluntary movers believed that their 
new neighborhood was worse (Schill and Nathan 1983). These results suggest that 
though the majority of displaced residents are ending up better off in terms of 
neighborhood quality, they are not ending up as better off as non-displaced movers. A 
study that used American Housing Survey data to focus on gentrification in the Boston 
area found that of the households facing higher housing costs, the majority also 
experienced increases in income to offset this increase. Most households within this 
group also experienced an increase in housing quality, neighborhood quality, or public 
service quality, or a combination of the three (Vigdor 2002).  
The results of both of these studies suggest that positive neighborhood effects are 
taking place, as incomes and neighborhood quality perceptions increase, though Schill 
and Nathan’s study notes that in comparison to non-displaced movers, the displaced are 
worse off, even if they are over all better off. This may be because displaced movers 
display lower income levels than non-displaced movers, and thus it is easier for non-
displaced movers to create social ties with residents of the better neighborhoods they 
move into. This allows voluntary movers to further garner benefits from positive 
neighborhood effects. On the other hand, the stigma of being low-income and a lack of 
previous interactions with higher-income individuals may prevent low-income displaced 
movers from establishing the same social ties within their better relocation 
neighborhoods. 
There are several patterns that reoccur within the cited studies and similar ones. 
The Copenhagen study as well as Dixon’s analysis of gentrification in Chicago both do 
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not specify what constitutes a better or worse neighborhood. Freeman (2006), Schill and 
Nathan (1983), and HUD (1981) focus on analysis of interviews or percentage 
differences rather than conducting econometric analysis. Schill and Nathan’s (1983) and 
HUD’s (1981) studies only cover instances of gentrification up until the 1980s. Finally, 
Vigdor’s research (2001), which is most similar of the papers mentioned to the research 
conducted in this study, only provides original research on the Boston area. By using geo-
coded PSID and decennial census data, extending the study into the 1990s, performing 
empirical econometric analysis, and utilizing clear measures of neighborhood 
characteristics, this study fills a gap in the literature by providing a more comprehensive 
and nationally representative analysis than past research has, and attempts to quantify 
many things that were qualitatively analyzed in past research. 
 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
In order to determine whether low-income residents are better or worse off after 
being displaced by gentrification one must create a model that specifies their residential 
location decision. In this study, the term “household” includes any person living in the 
home of the reference person. Urban area refers to the larger metropolitan area, and 
encompasses the neighborhoods of low-income and high-income households. Central city 
refers to the core of the city, where low-income households are assumed to locate under 
the theory of spatial mismatch because of their need to utilize public transportation in 
order to travel to work and school (Wilson 1987). I use a discrete choice framework with 
general representations of household utility, which is based on Kent’s (2008) approach 
for modeling school district choice, and Vigdor’s (2001) discussion of the driving forces 
of gentrification and relocation decisions in the face of gentrification. 
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A. Household Location Decision 
I assume a household will choose to live in the neighborhood in which net 
benefits are maximized. The term net benefits refers to the total value generated from 
living in a neighborhood minus the total cost of living in that neighborhood. Value 
represents the real dollar value of benefits from living in a specific neighborhood. While 
the costs of a neighborhood (rent, cost of transportation to work or school, etc,) are 
obvious, the concept of the value of a neighborhood can be less intuitive. The real dollar 
value of a neighborhood speaks to the monetary amount one gains from living in one 
neighborhood rather than another. For example, if living in one neighborhood exposes a 
resident to peers with better job connections, and thus the resident obtains a better paying 
job than they would have held in a different neighborhood, then any gains from this job 
that are over the gains from the job they would have otherwise held are considered to be 
part of the neighborhood’s real dollar value. Things like not having to get a car alarm 
because the neighborhood is safe enough to not require such precautions are also 
considered in the value of the neighborhood. In order to maximize value, V, a household 
chooses a neighborhood so that Vi > Vj; for all neighborhoods i, j. A household chooses 
neighborhood i if:  
[Vi(nbhoodcsmpi, othercsmp)-Ci] > [Vj(nbhoodcsmpj, othercsmp)-Cj] (1) 
where nbhoodcsmp represents neighborhood consumption, and othercsmp represents 
other consumption. C represents the total cost of living in the neighborhood and the cost 
of relocating to that neighborhood if it is not the neighborhood in which the household 
currently resides. The total cost of living in a neighborhood contains the cost of housing, 
as well as how much the household spends on essentials such as food and other staples, 
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and transportation costs to school or work. That is, I assume that households will do 
everyday shopping within their neighborhoods, and therefore the cost they incur from 
purchasing these goods is dependent on the typical costs of these goods in stores in their 
neighborhoods. Transportation costs may vary based upon how many public 
transportation options the neighborhood contains, and whether living in the neighborhood 
necessitates owning a car, as it would if an individual were living in the outer part of the 
urban area but working in the central city. The cost of relocating can be substantial, since 
in addition to the large cost of moving physical possessions, there is a large psychic cost 
associated with leaving behind the old neighborhood, where one is accustomed to the 
people, schools, stores, etc. This relocation cost is included in the cost of a neighborhood. 
Specifically, the cost of relocating to neighborhood j is included in the cost of j if the 
resident does not already reside in neighborhood j. A household should choose to move 
only if the value of moving exceeds the cost of moving. 
 This study is mostly concerned with the effects of people and social networks 
within a neighborhood on displaced residents who relocate into that neighborhood, so the 
model will focus on neighborhood and peer effects. All neighborhood-specific 
characteristics (such as public transportation options, the number of schools, the types of 
commercial business in the area) other than neighborhood effects are factors of other 
consumption. Rewriting equation (1), a household’s net benefits are now represented as a 
function of neighborhood effects (which is represented by nbhoodeffects) and all other 
consumption, so that the household chooses to live in neighborhood i if: 
[Vi(nbhoodeffectsi, othercsmp)-Ci] > [Vj(nbhoodeffectsj, othercsmp)-Cj], 
∀ i,j neighborhoods (2) 
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B. Neighborhood Effects Production Function 
Neighborhood effects are a function of peer effects, collective 
efficacy/socialization, social ties, and institutional resources (Freeman 2006). Research 
finds conflicting results about the effect of peers and social networks within a 
neighborhood upon other members of the neighborhood. The following six neighborhood 
characteristics are identified by Ginther et al. (2000) as measures that are frequently 
shown to have an effect on children’s outcomes in neighborhood effects studies: (1) 
percent of persons white (percwhite), (2) percent of families with a female head 
(percfemhead), (3) percent of persons who are low income (percpov), (4) percent of 
persons who are high income (perchighinc), (5) percent of young adults who are dropouts 
(percdropout), and (6) average adult unemployment rate (unemprate). Though Ginther 
(2000) finds that the significance of these variables on children’s outcomes decreases as 
family variables are taken into account, these variables are nonetheless the ones most 
commonly seen as significant in affecting future outcomes of children. Since this study is 
concerned with adult outcomes, rather than children’s outcomes, family variables should 
also be less significant, which may in turn suggest that neighborhoods play a larger role 
as one moves from childhood to adulthood. Taking these factors into account, a 
household chooses neighborhood i if: 
[Vi(f(percwhitei, percfemheadi, percpovi, 
percperchighinci, percdropouti, unempratei), othercsmp)-Ci] 
> 
[Vj(f(percwhitej, percfemheadj, percpovj, 
perchighincj, percdropoutj, unempratej), othercsmp)-Cj], 
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∀ i,j neighborhoods (3) 
C. Initial Equilibrium 
In the pre-gentrification equilibrium, low-income and high-income households 
reside in different neighborhoods due to the segregating forces of neighborhood effects 
and other factors, particularly transportation options (Wilson 1987). Low-income 
households locate within the central city because of their inability to afford cars, and the 
availability of public transportation in the central city. High-income households locate 
largely in the outer parts of the urban area, from where they may either commute by 
automobile to work or choose to work away from the central city. Under this equilibrium, 
the differences between the values of benefits across households are explained by both 
the neighborhood and other inputs, as low-income households consume worse 
neighborhood effects and fewer other goods when compared to higher-income 
households (i.e. low-income households need car alarms, and high-income households 
get to find out about better jobs). Assuming a perfectly competitive housing market, each 
household maximizes its value. In this Pareto optimal condition, no household can 
increase its net value. Moving to another neighborhood is not an option, because to do so 
would be to decrease the net value of another household. Therefore, for any household 
[Vi(f(percwhitei, percfemheadi, percpovi, 
percperchighinci, percdropouti, unempratei), othercsmp)-Ci] 
= 
[Vj(f(percwhitej, percfemheadj, percpovj, 
perchighincj, percdropoutj, unempratej), othercsmp)-Cj], 
∀ i,j neighborhoods (4) 
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D. Gentrification 
Gentrification can be either income-driven or preference-driven. As an example, 
income-driven gentrification can be driven by a technological advancement in a specific 
urban area, which increases the productivity of highly-skilled workers while not affecting 
the productivity of low-skill workers. I assume highly-skilled workers are high-income, 
while low-skill workers are low-income. The increase in productivity causes an increase 
in wages for highly-skilled workers, and this in turn increases highly-skilled workers’ 
willingness to pay to live in the urban area, so they choose to move, and disrupt former 
neighborhood demographics, in order to maximize their net value. In the case of 
preference-driven gentrification, high-income households start considering locating 
closer to the city center more attractive. This can be because neighborhood and housing 
characteristics in the city center become attractive to the wealthy, or because a decrease 
in childbearing decreases the demand for space among high-income workers, or because 
of any number of other reasons that would shift preferences. In any case, their willingness 
to pay to live in the urban area increases, and they move in order to maximize their net 
value. In both preference-driven and income-driven gentrification, the distribution of the 
six neighborhood effects variables changes across neighborhoods as high-income 
households relocate. Thus, for any low-income household  
[Vi(f(percwhitei, percfemheadi, percpovi, 
percperchighinci, percdropouti, unempratei), othercsmp)-Ci] 
≠ 
[Vj(f(percwhitej, percfemheadj, percpovj, 
perchighincj, percdropoutj, unempratej), othercsmp)-Cj], 
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∀ i, j neighborhoods (5) 
The shock of gentrification on the initial equilibrium disrupts a low-income 
household’s maximization of net value, as low-income households are no longer in a 
Pareto optimal situation because the preferences of low-income households presumably 
do not shift to perfectly offset the changes in preferences of high-income households. 
That is, low-income households do not necessarily prefer to trade places with high-
income households who now prefer to live in low-income neighborhoods (Vigdor 2001). 
Denoting their original neighborhood as o (for original), a neighborhood with more 
positive neighborhood effects as b (for better), and a neighborhood with more negative 
neighborhood effects as w (for worse), low-income households must choose which of the 
following optimizes their value in the face of gentrification: 
Vo(f(percwhiteo, percfemheado, percpovo, percperchighinco, percdropouto, unemprateo), 
othercsmp)-Co 
 
Vb(f(percwhiteb, percfemheadb, percpovb, percperchighincb, percdropoutb, unemprateb), 
othercsmp)-Cb 
 
Vw(f(percwhitew, percfemheadw, percpovw, percperchighincw, percdropoutw, unempratew), 
othercsmp)-Cw 
(6) 
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E. New Equilibrium 
In order to once again maximize their net benefits, low-income households react 
to gentrification by either moving until they once again maximize the net benefits of their 
location or remaining in their original neighborhoods. Equilibrium is reached when all 
households are maximizing their value and garnering the neighborhood effects they 
desire.  
Since gentrification is a purely urban phenomenon, and past studies have shown 
that the displaced do not locate away from the central city, it is reasonable to assume that 
in a model of residential location decision in the face of gentrification, all central city 
households have access to public transportation, and thus all central city households have 
access to educational institutions and workplaces throughout the city (Lyons 1996; Schill 
and Nathan 1983). If value generated from transportation is equal for all low-income 
households who face the potential of displacement across the central city, and 
transportation options allow access to jobs and schools across the central city, then these 
characteristics can be removed from the residential location decision model for low-
income households, with the exception of specific cases in which low-income households 
may consider locating out of the central city. 
In the case of income-driven gentrification, low-income households may become 
displaced. If a poor household’s cost of moving is zero, and the household can derive the 
same net value from another area, and household mobility only has effects within the 
housing market, then the household moves out of the urban area. As mentioned in section 
(D), this is unlikely to be the case, and the assumptions of a zero moving cost and a lack 
of effects from housing mobility are unrealistic (Vigdor 2001).  
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When a low-income household faces moving costs that are so large that they 
prohibit moving, it affects the net value of its alternative relocation neighborhood, as the 
cost to move is so great as to exceed the value. Low-income households who rent their 
housing lose net value in this situation, as the cost of living in their neighborhood 
increases. Low-income households who own homes may experience increases in costs if 
property taxes and insurance premia increase, but may also gain the benefit of an increase 
in housing equity as gentrification occurs, so the overall effect on net value is unclear for 
these households (Vigdor 2001).  
The two aforementioned situations present what happens to low-income 
households in the extreme cases of no moving costs or completely prohibitive moving 
costs. In actuality, low-income households are likely to end up somewhere between these 
two extremes, with some households becoming displaced to better or worse 
neighborhoods, and others choosing to increase their willingness to pay in order to 
remain in their original neighborhood (Vigdor 2001).  
Preference-driven gentrification can cause the previously mentioned outcomes as 
well, but also presents a situation in which low-income households can definitely 
increase their net value. For this to occur, high-income households must have an increase 
in their willingness to pay for housing close to the central city, as well as a decrease in 
their willingness to pay for housing away from the central city. This causes there to be 
more land area where low-income households have a higher willingness to pay than high-
income households. This can end in low-income households moving to better areas for a 
lower cost, since demand for housing in these formerly high-income neighborhoods has 
decreased. Depending on whether this demand for housing decreases significantly 
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enough, housing prices throughout the urban area may drop, which would result in 
increases in net value for renters, and once again ambiguous effects for homeowners 
(Vigdor 2001). 
In both types of gentrification, even if the low-income household desires to stay, 
other forces may cause it to relocate. Eviction and harassment by landlords increase the 
cost of staying in the original neighborhood, and may make the cost of relocating appear 
insignificant in comparison. Conversely, low-income households may decide to remain in 
the neighborhood if gentrification creates new opportunities in the job market, increases 
the amount of public services available through increased tax collection from high-
income gentrifiers, or directly improves neighborhood quality. Overall, theory cannot 
predict clearly whether a low-income household will relocate to a better or worse 
neighborhood, or choose to remain in its original neighborhood. 
F. Estimation Strategy 
In order to determine whether a person is better or worse off, one must choose a 
quantifiable measure of the value of benefits of a neighborhood. Ideally, a well-being 
variable would capture the amount that individuals gain from social service and 
government assistance programs, the wages and incomes of individuals, and any changes 
among other factors that are likely to change as neighborhood effects occur.  
Wage and income are the two measures of well-being used in this study.2 While 
this is not ideal, income and wage do encompass many other factors that neighborhood 
effects may affect. For example, if a low-income individual encounters more college-
educated individuals in the neighborhood they relocate to, and chooses to pursue higher 
                                                
2 I also attempted to use a ratio of rent to income as a measure of well-being. However, because of high 
non-response rates in the PSID, there were too few observations remaining after the addition of a rent 
variable to allow for meaningful analysis.  
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education, resulting in a diploma they had not previously held, this should then result in 
an increase in wage and income as well. A displaced individual may also be informed of 
the benefits of joining a union by better-informed residents in their new neighborhood. 
On the other hand, moving into a neighborhood with worse neighborhood effects could 
cause an individual to have to devote more time to protecting their housing and thus 
detract from time they can spend pursuing measures to increase their income. Relocating 
to a new neighborhood can also have effects not captured in income changes, such as the 
psychic effects of changing social ties, and my analysis cannot quantify or account for 
these factors, unless they affect the individual’s income or wage, and even then these 
factors will not be distinguishable from other factors.  
To estimate the effect of relocating on income and wage, one must look at the 
difference between the income level and wage of the relocated person several years after 
relocation and the income level they had in their former neighborhood. I choose to look at 
the individual two years after they have relocated to a new neighborhood, as this seems 
like an appropriate amount of time to garner new neighborhood effects, and a person is 
unlikely to relocate again within two years. The dependent variable in the ideal regression 
equation measures income or wage changes over the two years in natural log form. The 
natural logs of income and wage are taken because these allow one to see the percent 
change in income rather than the change in income levels. The percent change is 
preferable since low-income residents by definition have very low incomes and wages, 
and thus what may seem like a small change in income or wage for most people may 
indeed be a large change for a low-income person.  
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Since the dependent variable is change in income or wages, the independent 
variables should be changes in income or wage determinants. Traditional Mincerian wage 
determinants are age, age-squared (for the U-shape relationship with wage), sex, race, 
union membership, education, industry, and occupation. Age and age-squared are 
included as levels rather than differences because all residents age the same amount over 
two years, and thus there is no variation in the variables. Sex and race are included not as 
changes, but as levels, as well, since they would otherwise be differenced out. While 
variables like sex or race do not change over time, they may have significant effects on 
the rate at which an individual’s income increases. That is to say, white males may be 
more easily promoted or otherwise encounter income increases more than typically 
disadvantaged groups.   
A dummy variable equal to one if a household is displaced, and equal to zero 
otherwise is added. A dummy variable equal to one if a household lived in a gentrifying 
tract in the base year, and equal to zero otherwise is also added. The two aforementioned 
variables are interacted to create a variable equal to one if a household was displaced 
from a gentrifying tract in the base year. Variables accounting for the differences in the 
six neighborhood effects variables between the gentrifying neighborhood and the 
relocation neighborhood are included. These six variables are meant to check whether a 
change in neighborhood effects has a significant effect on changes in income or wage. 
These six terms are then interacted with the displacement and gentrification dummies in 
order to see the effects of various neighborhood effects on residents who are displaced by 
gentrification. The ideal guiding equation appears as follows, using wage as the 
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dependent variable, though the log difference of income levels would be used as a 
dependent variable as well:  
ln(NewWage) - ln(OldWage) = 
 
α + β1Age + β2Age2 + β3Sex + β4Race + β5ChangeinUnion + β6ChangeinEducation + 
β7ChangeinIndustry + β8ChangeinOccupation + β9Displaced+ 
β10FromGentrifyingNeighborhood + β11Displaced*FromGentrifyingNeighborhood + 
β12ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweenNeighborhoods + 
β13ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenNeighborhoods + 
β14ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenNeighborhoods + 
β15ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenNeighborhoods + 
β16ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenNeighborhoods + 
β17ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenNeighborhoods +  
β18Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweeNeighborhoods +  
β19Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenNeighborhoods + 
β20Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenNeighborhoods + 
β21Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenNeighborhoods+ 
β22Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenNeighborhoods + 
β23Displa*Gent*ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenNeighborhoods + εi 
(7) 
 
where Displa is notation for Displaced and Gent is notation for 
FromGentrifyingNeighborhood, and variables with asterisks are interaction terms. No 
prediction is being made as to whether displaced residents will be better or worse off, so 
no predictions of the signs of the coefficients of these variables are made. 
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IV. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
A. Data 
This study uses data from the geo-coded Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
in conjunction with decennial census data.3 The geo-codes are tract level and used to link 
the PSID to census data.4 The PSID is a longitudinal, nationally representative study that 
has been conducted since 1968, and contains social, health, and economic information on 
nearly 9,000 families and the individuals within those families, residing in the United 
States. Because the PSID follows the same individuals and families over years, it can be 
used to observe relocation from one neighborhood to another (i.e. when faced with 
gentrification). Moreover, when the PSID is linked to geographical data, one can observe 
how these individuals’ and families’ statuses change as the characteristics of their 
neighborhoods change.  
This study uses an extraction of data from the 1990 Census of Population and 
Housing (Tape Files 3A and 3B) collected by Adams (2000) to determine neighborhood 
characteristics. This dataset includes over 120 census variables and over 100 variables 
that were derived from those 120. These variables can be linked to many levels of 
geographic areas, including tracts, and contain information on ethnicity, family 
structures, income, education, labor force activity, and housing.  
The following six variables from Adams’ (2000) dataset are used to measure 
neighborhood characteristics of each tract contained in the PSID data: (1) percentage of 
                                                
3 The PSID is the most often used data set for national studies of gentrification that require longitudinally 
linked observations of residents. The American Housing Survey (AHS) is a popular alternative, but since it 
is longitudinally linked by housing unit, not household, it is not ideal for this paper. Data sets detailing 
smaller geographic areas are also often used for gentrification research, though these often focus on 
neighborhoods specifically identified as gentrifying, and by definition offer fewer observations for analysis.  
4 Census tracts are small, relatively stable geographic areas delineated by the census that typically contain 
between 2,500 and 8,000 residents. Tracts are meant to follow the same boundaries as recognized 
neighborhoods. 
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persons white, (2) percentage of families with female head, (3) percentage of all persons 
in households with incomes below federal poverty threshold, (4) percentage of families 
with 1989 incomes greater than $50,000, (5) percentage of young adults who have not 
graduated from high school and are not in school, and (6) adult unemployment rate x100. 
These six variables are meant to mimic those that Ginther et al. (2000) identify as being 
consistently significant across neighborhoods effects studies.  
The PSID data and Adams’ (2000) data are used in conjunction with 1990 and 
2000 Census of Population and Housing data to determine which tracts/neighborhoods 
have undergone gentrification in the 1990s. Data from the Neighborhood Change 
Database (a GeoLytics product) are used to determine how tract definitions have changed 
between 1990 and 2000. Due to data limitations, this study utilizes only those census 
tracts whose boundaries did not change and were not renamed between 1990 and 2000. 
Thus, roughly 49 percent of tracts are represented in the analysis.  
The unit of analysis in the study is the individual who describes him or herself as 
the household head in the PSID, since this is the individual about whom the PSID collects 
the most data and the only household member for whom the PSID describes geographical 
movement. Each census tract will be considered a neighborhood.5  
B. Variable Specification 
Table 1 in the appendix contains information on variables used in regressions, 
their notations, and the data sources from which they come. The PSID contains direct 
data on income, wage, age, sex, race, union membership, education, industry, occupation, 
                                                
5 This may bias results if a tract identified as gentrifying is larger or smaller than the actual area that is 
gentrifying. That is, those residents on the fringe of the tract in either direction may not be accurately 
represented. Since census tracts are meant to represent commonly recognized neighborhoods, and 
gentrification is usually contained within neighborhoods exhibiting specific characteristics, this is not a 
large concern, and no corrective measure is taken.  
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area of residency, and moving. Since the PSID is a panel, and longitudinally linked, 
differences between these variables from year to year can be calculated for individuals. In 
many cases, the PSID does not re-ask questions whose answers typically do not change 
over years, but carries them forward from year to year. Thus, some variation in variables 
like education may not be captured unless the head chooses to state that he/she pursued 
further education. While it would be ideal to difference all independent variables for 
which it is possible, because of this limitation, no person-specific right-hand side 
variables will be differenced. That is, age, age-squared, sex, race, union status, education 
level, industry, and occupation will reflect the values for these variables in the period 
after relocation, rather than reflecting the change in these variables that has occurred 
since gentrification. This will affect results since differences in these variables would 
correspond more appropriately with dependent variables that are expressed in differences. 
Particularly, since neighborhood characteristics variables are expressed in differences, it 
may be the case that these difference variables will pick up changes that should be 
attributed to changes in the demographic variables that are expressed in levels. However, 
since there would be minimal variation in demographic variables if they were differenced 
because of the re-asking limitation, it is more appropriate to use levels rather than low-
variation differences.  
Freeman’s (2005) framework is used to determine whether a neighborhood was 
gentrifying in the base period or not. As he states, in order to be considered gentrifying, a 
neighborhood must meet the following criteria: 
1. Be located in the central city at the beginning of the intercensal period. 
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2. Have a median income less than the median (40th percentile) for that 
metropolitan area at the beginning of the intercensal period. 
3. Have a proportion of housing built within the past 20 years lower than the 
proportion found at the median (40th percentile) for the respective 
metropolitan area. 
4. Have a percentage increase in educational attainment greater than the median 
increase in educational attainment for that metropolitan area. 
5. Have an increase in real housing prices during the intercensal period (Freeman 
2005). 
The first qualification for gentrification speaks to the fact that gentrification is a 
purely urban phenomenon. The second qualification presents a rather high cutoff (40th 
percentile) for income level in a gentrifying neighborhood, but this is mostly done 
because the PSID does not contain enough observations of displaced residents living in 
neighborhoods below this income level to provide meaningful regression results at lower 
percentiles. The third qualification ensures there has been disinvestment in the 
neighborhood for the past two decades, thus allowing for housing values to have fallen, 
and providing gentrifiers with a reinvestment opportunity. The fourth qualification 
ensures that the neighborhood is indeed moving from a low-income (and thus likely low-
skill and low-educational level) to a high-income (and thus likely high-skill and high-
income level) neighborhood because of in-movers (who are assumed to have higher 
levels of educational attainment than people already residing within the neighborhood), 
and not because of other forces that may be generally increasing educational attainment 
throughout the central city. The fifth qualification ensures that in-movers are reinvesting 
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in the neighborhood, specifically in housing. While this may seem like a very strict 
definition of gentrification that is contingent on many variables, it is helpful in ensuring 
that instances of gentrification are not overstated.  
The response to the “Why moved?” variable in the PSID is used to determine if a 
person was displaced. The responses of “Response to outside events (involuntary 
reasons): HU [housing unit] coming down; being evicted; armed services, etc.; health 
reasons; divorce; retiring because of health” or “Ambiguous or mixed reasons: to save 
money; all my old neighbors moved away; retiring (NA why)” qualify an individual as 
displaced. This tends to overstate displacement since moving because of divorce or the 
armed services, etc. is not necessarily the type of displacement that would be related with 
gentrification. The data do not offer any way to differentiate these reasons for moving 
from more clearly displacement-related reasons. A resident has to be displaced from a 
neighborhood characterized as gentrifying in order to be considered displaced by 
gentrification. 
C. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 shows the means of variables used in this sample as compared to national 
means of those same or similar variables. The summary statistics collected show that the 
sample used for analysis has more generally disadvantaged individuals than what would 
have been nationally representative. The PSID sample also shows that typically 20.71% 
of people moved over two-year time spans, while the census shows that 41.23% of people 
in the United States moved between 1985 and 1990, a five-year time span. Extrapolating 
that since 20.71% of PSID observations moved in a two-year period, roughly 51.78% 
(two-and-half times as many) would move in a five-year period, assuming no repeat 
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movers, it becomes clear that the PSID may be slightly over-representative of movers. 
This may mean that instances of being displaced by gentrification are also overstated. 
However, since it is likely that some movers are repeat movers, the PSID percent of 
movers is likely closer to the national average than the extrapolation suggests.  
Tables 3 through 9 describe additional summary statistics. The income minimum 
of 1 represents those who are “not working for money.” The 1 is recoded from 0 in order 
for observations not to be dropped when using the natural log form. The same is done for 
the wage variable. 
Coding for education changed during the sample years, and takes on values of 0-
17, with 0 meaning no education, 12 meaning completion of high school, 16 meaning 
completion of college, and 17 meaning any educational attainment beyond undergraduate 
education. Thus, education is measured in years up until the value of 16, after which 17 is 
used to represent any education beyond college.  
Sex is coded as 0 for males and 1 for females, so the mean of 0.35 means that 
only 35% of observations are female. This is because the PSID prefers for the household 
head to be male and will call a female’s significant other or any male residing in the 
household the “householder” and the female the “wife” even when the householder has 
only been a member of the household for a brief time (sometimes only several months). 
Unfortunately, moving information is not collected on the “wife,” so a householder can 
report on his moving into the home, but this does not necessarily mean that the “wife” did 
not already reside in the home prior to him. There is also no way to easily determine 
whether the “wife” a householder reports for one year is the same as the “wife” reported 
in other years, which is another reason why “wives” are not used in the analysis. All of 
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this suggests that single mothers who are displaced by gentrification may not be 
adequately represented in the sample, and that no conclusions can be drawn about 
whether displacement by gentrification affect males and females differently.  
The sample of households in this paper also seems to be over-representative of the 
unemployed and those who are not in the labor force, as 31.12% of householders report 
that they are “Not working for money now.” While the corresponding national percentage 
is 38.80%, it is notable that the national sample has more women, a higher percentage of 
non-working age individuals, and a lower level of educational attainment. Thus, it is 
understandable that the national sample has such a large percentage of individuals who 
are either not in the labor force or unemployed. The PSID sample consists of household 
heads, who are mostly working age males, and thus the 31.12% of individuals not 
working for money is abnormally high. This means that residents displaced from 
gentrifying neighborhoods are being compared in large part to other disadvantaged 
residents in this study.  
Comparing observations of those displaced by gentrification with all displaced 
persons, all movers, and all observations, it is clear that those displaced by gentrification 
have the lowest incomes and wages. Notably, those displaced by gentrification also have 
the highest percent increase in income two years after relocation. Looking at the changes 
in neighborhood characteristics variables, while the changes for all movers and all 
observations are not consistently better or worse, the summary statistics on all displaced 
residents and residents displaced by gentrification show that almost each neighborhood 
characteristic shows improvement after relocation. This shows that displaced residents 
are moving to better neighborhoods. Coupled with the increase in income for residents 
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displaced by gentrification, this suggests that positive changes in neighborhood 
characteristics could be significantly affecting income. Changes in wage are much less 
dramatic for displaced observations, and do not show any consistent patterns across the 
various groupings of observations.  
The mean for moved is 0.21, meaning that 21% of observations in the entire 
sample moved. Six percent of the entire sample was displaced, and 1% was displaced 
specifically by gentrification. Looking at only observations that moved in the sample 
period, 30% were displaced, and 4% were displaced specifically by gentrification. 
Twelve percent of all displaced observations were displaced by gentrification.  
 
 
V. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Estimation Issues 
 
Initial regressions shows that Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are high, with 
many variables above 10 (see Tables 25 and 26), but all variables are theoretically 
important, and thus no corrective measure is taken. Initial regressions also show that 
heteroskedasticity is significant, so robust t-statistics are used in all regressions. Dummy 
variables are created for race, industry, and occupation, for which coefficients and 
standard errors are reported in separate regression result tables. F tests are also performed 
on these dummy variables to observe total significance of race, industry, and occupation.  
While one would also think that there may be endogeneity between the dependent 
variables of income and wage, and changes in neighborhood characteristics, this may not 
be the case in this study because of the way in which variables are specified. That is, one 
would expect that as a person’s income increases, they might relocate to a better 
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neighborhood. Similarly, a decrease in income might lead to relocation to a worse 
neighborhood. The fact that income and wage could be affecting neighborhood choice in 
this way could make it potentially difficult to separate out effects that neighborhood 
characteristics are having on income or wage. Differencing wage and income, and 
including neighborhood characteristics should do away with some of the potential for 
endogeneity. The income and wages that are stated for the base year represent incomes 
and wages at the time of relocation, and incomes and wages in the relocation 
neighborhood are incomes and wages two years after relocation. Since it is unlikely that 
one would move simply because they expect a change in income or wages in the near 
future (a situation in which a change in wage or income would be driving a change in 
neighborhood), it is unlikely that income and wage changes are driving neighborhood 
choices in this model. An example of a situation in which one would relocate because of 
the expectation of higher income is a recent college graduate moving to a neighborhood 
where their neighborhood quality will be a function of the starting wage they expect.  
Being displaced, by definition, also means that a change in one’s income are wage is not 
the primary driving force behind relocating from one neighborhood to another.  
Even if a recent change in income or wages is considered in the neighborhood 
relocation decision, the fact that two years are spent in the relocation neighborhood 
before the “after” income and wage data is collected means that the difference in income 
or wages that is observed over this time is something that has occurred while in the new 
neighborhood, and has not driven the household to yet another relocation. This means 
that the observed change in income or wage is not causing the change in neighborhood 
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characteristics. No corrective measure is taken for the potential for endogeneity, since 
there is a lack of an available instrumental variable to be used as a proxy. 
B. Estimation Equation 
 
The following is the basic regression equation used for analysis: 
 
ln(NewWage) - ln(OldWage) = 
 
α + β1Age + β2Age2 + β3Sex + β4Race + β5Union + β6Education + β7Industry + 
β8Occupation + β9Displaced+ β10FromGentrifyingTract + 
β11Displaced*FromGentrifyingTract + 
β12ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweenTracts + 
β13ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenTracts + 
β14ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenTracts + 
β15ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenTracts + 
β16ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenTracts + 
β17ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenTracts +  
β18Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweenTracts +  
β19Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenTracts + 
β20Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenTracts + 
β21Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenTracts+ 
β22Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenTracts + 
β23Displa*Gent*ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenTracts + εi 
 (8) 
The above is the regression equation used in regressions (vii) though (xii). Regressions (i) 
through (vi) use a similar regression equation, though they do not include any 
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neighborhood characteristics variables, or interaction terms that include neighborhood 
characteristics variables. The first three regressions in each of these two sets are run on 
changes in wage, while the last three are run on changes in income.  
Regressions are run first on all observations in the sample, then all moved 
observations, and finally all displaced observations. While past research typically focuses 
on comparing those encountering gentrification to all movers, this study uses the 
aforementioned three sample types in order to see whether those displaced by 
gentrification fare differently compared to different reference groups. All samples are 
limited to only residents living in urban areas in the gentrification period so that control 
observations are as similar as possible to observations of residents displaced by 
gnetrification.  
 Regressions (xiii) through (xviii) use the following regression equation: 
ln(NewWage) = 
 
α + β1Age + β2Age2 + β3Sex + β4Race + β5Union + β6Education + β7Industry + 
β8Occupation + β9Displaced+ β10FromGentrifyingTract + 
β11Displaced*FromGentrifyingTract +  
β12ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweenTracts + 
β13ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenTracts + 
β14ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenTracts + 
β15ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenTracts + 
β16ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenTracts + 
β17ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenTracts +  
β18Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofWhitePersonsBetweenTracts +  
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β19Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofFamilieswithFemaleHeadBetweenTracts + 
β20Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonsinPovertyBetweenTracts + 
β21Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofPersonswithHighIncomeBetweenTracts+ 
β22Displa*Gent*ChangeinPercentofDropoutsBetweenTracts + 
β23Displa*Gent*ChangeinUnemploymentRateBetweenTracts + εi 
 (9) 
In this set of regressions, the first three regressions are run on wages in the time period 
after relocation, while the last three are run on income in the time period after relocation. 
The purpose of running regressions on post-relocation wages and incomes, rather than 
differences in wages and incomes, is to ascertain how residents displaced by 
gentrification fare in comparison to other people in samples, rather than in comparison to 
how they themselves were doing two years prior, before gentrification and relocation. 
Thus, the analysis in this study evaluates both how residents displaced by gentrification’s 
well-beings vary across time, and solely in comparison to other groups of residents.  
C. Main Results 
 
Gentdispla and its interactions with neighborhood characteristics variables are the 
variables of interest in these regressions. Thus, the interaction terms of neighborhood 
characteristics with being displaced by gentrification are analyzed as two-way interaction 
terms, where gentdispla is a dummy equal to 1 if a person was displaced by gentrification 
in the base period.  
Regressions (i) through (vi) do not include neighborhood characteristics, in an 
attempt to see what the effects of being displaced by gentrification are when 
neighborhood effects are not considered. Results from these regressions are reported in 
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tables 10 through 14. In all six regressions presented in these tables, being displaced by 
gentrification does not have significant effects on changes in income or wage over two 
years. This suggests that on its own, being displaced by gentrification does not have a 
significant impact on wage or income change. This may be because of a lack of social 
mixing in relocation neighborhoods that would prevent neighborhood effects from being 
absorbed, or because relocation neighborhoods are very similar to the neighborhoods that 
people relocate from. It could also be that people displaced by gentrification move into 
either better or worse neighborhoods, and when these two relocation options are not 
separately analyzed, the results are clouded. It may also be that changes in neighborhood 
demographics simply do not affect residents. Notably, many of the demographic 
variables which are often significant in determining wages and income do not show up as 
significant in these six regressions either. This may be because levels of demographic 
variables are not ideal for describing changes in the dependent variables of changes in 
wage and income. However, as discussed in the Summary Statistics section, no better 
option exists for analysis with these data. 
To check whether neighborhood effects are significant in determining outcomes 
for residents displaced by gentrification, regressions (vii) through (xii) include the six 
neighborhood characteristic variables and interactions of these terms with dummy 
variables for displacement and gentrification. Results for these regressions are shown in 
tables 15 through 19. Unlike in the previous set of regressions, being displaced by 
gentrification does have significant effects in these regressions, namely when 
neighborhood effects are considered. This shows that differences between relocation 
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neighborhoods can account for some of the impact of being displaced by gentrification on 
changes in wage and income.     
In regressions (vii), (viii) and (ix), being displaced by gentrification has a small, 
positive effect, though it is insignificant. The coefficient on gentdispladrop in regression 
(vii) is -0.028, meaning that when looking at a sample of all residents, for every 
percentage point increase in dropouts between the gentrifying tract and the tract to which 
the resident relocates, the wage of a resident displaced by gentrification significantly 
decreases by 2.8%, thus taking away from some of the original small positive change 
caused simply by being displaced by gentrification. In regression (viii), the interpretation 
of gentdispladrop is the same, except that the decrease is 2.9% rather than 2.8%, and the 
sample only includes movers. In regression (ix), which uses a sample of only displaced 
residents, the decrease is 2.7%. In the regressions in this set that use changes in wage as 
the dependent variable, gentdispladrop is the only variable to show up as significant out 
of the neighborhood characteristic variables for residents displaced by gentrification. This 
suggests that of all neighborhood characteristics, the percent of dropouts has the largest 
effect on the well-being of residents displaced by gentrification. It is likely that school 
dropouts also have other negative characteristics that may be negatively affecting wages. 
It should be noted, though, that in economic terms, a 2.8 or 2.9 or 2.7 percent change in 
wage is not very significant.  
Regressions (x) and (xi)—which have changes in income as the dependent 
variable, and are run on all observations and all moved observations, respectively—have 
a greater number of significant results for interaction terms of neighborhood effects and 
being displaced by gentrification. Between these two regressions, all six of the 
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neighborhood effects variables are shown to have significant effects on the income of 
residents displaced by gentrification.  
In regressions (x) and (xi), all six interaction terms are significant. In regression 
(xii), gentdisplahigh is significant. The coefficient on gentdisplawhite is negative in 
regressions (x) and (xi). The coefficient on gentdisplapov is positive in these regressions, 
as is the coefficient on gentdisplaunemp. All of these results are not consistent with 
theory, as an increase in white people across neighborhoods should lead to income gains, 
while increases in poverty or unemployment should decrease income. Since the 
magnitudes of gentdispla are so large and negative, and the magnitudes of the 
neighborhood interaction terms are so large, it is likely that these results are not very 
meaningful, and that the data could benefit from being disaggregated by whether the 
person relocated to a better or worse neighborhood. The coefficients on gentdisplafem are 
negative and significant in regressions (x) and (xi), as are the coefficients on 
gentdispladrop. The coefficients on gentdisplahigh are positive and significant in 
regressions (x), (xi), and (xii). The results on these three interaction terms are consistent 
with theory, as an increase in female-headed households or dropouts should cause income 
decreases, while an increase in the amount of high-income households should cause 
income gains. However, the magnitudes on all of these variables are obscenely high, 
suggesting once again that the data should be disaggregated and otherwise improved 
upon. 
Finally, it is notable that in none of these twelve regressions does being displaced 
by gentrification without the consideration of neighborhood effects have any negative or 
positive effects on wage or income or changes in the two. This suggests that any 
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differences in income or wage that residents encounter are functions of differences in 
neighborhood characteristics, thus lending support to the theory of neighborhood effects. 
This also means that people displaced by gentrification are experiencing at least some 
social mixing, as they are evidently influenced by their neighbors.   
In summary, while simply being displaced by gentrification does not have a 
significant effect on how much one’s income or wage changes over the two years after 
leaving the gentrifying neighborhood, specific neighborhood characteristics can offset or 
worsen the core effect of being displaced by gentrification. However, because of data 
limitations, this paper does not accurately address what neighborhood characteristics are 
important in determining the outcomes of residents displaced by gentrification, as many 
variables are largely out of line with theory.  
D. Robustness 
 
To check the robustness of my results, I use the natural log of post-gentrification 
relocation wage and the natural log of post-gentrification income as dependent variables, 
rather than differences. Results for robustness regressions are reported in tables 20 
through 24. These results measure how much an individual who was displaced by 
gentrification’s wage or income is different from an individual’s who was not. That is, 
the incomes and wages of residents who were displaced by gentrification are being 
compared to those of people who were not, in the post period.  
In this set of six regressions, the effect of being displaced by gentrification is 
never significant and always negative, though it varies in magnitude. The only 
neighborhood effects measures that show up as significant are gentdispladrop and 
gentdisplapov.  
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 The coefficient on gentdisplapov is significant and positive in regression (xvi), 
which looks at a sample of all observations and has income as the dependent variable. 
The coefficient is 0.489, suggesting that for every one percentage point increase in people 
living in poverty across the two neighborhoods, a resident displaced by gentrification will 
experience an income that is 48.9% higher than the income of other people living in the 
neighborhood. This makes sense if residents who are displaced by gentrification move to 
severely impoverished neighborhoods where their incomes are drastically higher than the 
incomes of other residents of the neighborhood. This supports the idea that residents 
displaced by gentrification can move to much worse neighborhoods. This only makes 
sense if the income of residents displaced by gentrification starts out higher than the 
average residents of an impoverished neighborhood when they relocate there initially, 
and manages to remain much higher two years later. It is more difficult to contemplate 
how moving to a more impoverished neighborhood could cause one’s income to increase 
so significantly. If the former explanation suffices, then this supports the idea that there is 
very little social mixing between residents displaced by gentrification and their new 
neighbors, as they are not being affected by the low incomes of their neighbors.   
The coefficients on gentdispladrop are significant in regressions (xiii), (xiv), 
(xiv), and (xvii), and consistently negative, though they vary in magnitude. This all 
suggests that if a resident displaced by gentrification moves to a neighborhood with more 
dropouts, their income will be significantly lower than that of residents who were not 
displaced by gentrification. This suggests that social mixing does occur, as residents are 
negatively influenced by their neighbors’ lack of education. That gentdispladrop is the 
variable that most frequently shows up as significant suggests that the percent of dropouts 
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in a neighborhood has the largest effect on in-movers, or that perhaps dropouts carry 
many other negative characteristics as well. It should be noted that these neighborhood 
characteristics are not positive enough to counteract the general negative effect of being 
displaced by gentrification.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Results presented in this paper suggest that residents displaced by gentrification 
are relatively susceptible to differences in neighborhood characteristics between the 
gentrifying neighborhoods they leave and the neighborhoods they relocate to. This 
supports the theory of neighborhood effects, though not always in the direction predicted 
by theory. This suggests that the data needs to be disaggregated based on whether 
residents are moving to better or worse neighborhoods, and that more observations of 
people displaced by gentrification are necessary.  
Because this study covers 1990-1995, its findings are most relevant for cities that 
experienced second-wave gentrification. The large majority of residents displaced by 
gentrification in the various samples were from California, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, or 
Pennsylvania, suggesting that the findings are most reflective of instances of 
gentrification in these states.  
In addition to disaggregating the sample and having more observations of 
residents displaced by gentrification, future studies should control for the use of housing 
vouchers and other housing assistance, to attempt to see how much this affects the 
experience of residents displaced by gentrification. Future research would also benefit 
from a refined and less ambiguous definition of displacement, the inclusion of a measure 
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of neighborhood assets (such as number of schools, number of transportation options, 
etc.), as well as an extended time frame.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
REFERENCES 
Adams, Terry K. Census of Population and Housing, 1990 [United States]: Extract Data 
 [Computer file]. ICPSR02889-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium 
 for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2000. doi:10.3886/ICPSR02889  
Allen, Irving. “The Ideology of Dense Neighbourhood Redevelopment: Cultural 
 Diversity and Transcendent Community Experience.” Urban Affairs Quarterly 
 15 (1984): 409-428. 
 
Atkinson, Rowland. "Measuring Gentrification and Displacement in Greater London." 
 Urban Studies 37 (2000): 149-165. 
Crowder, Kyle, and Scott J. South. "Race, Class, and Changing Patterns of Migration 
between Poor and Nonpoor Neighborhoods." American Journal of Sociology 110.6 
(2005): 1715-63.  
Dixon, Bruce. “On Gentrification in Chicago.” 1998. 6 October 2009 
 <http://www.mdcbowen.org/p5/np/on_gentrification_in_chicago.htm>. 
 
Freeman, Lance. "Displacement or Succession?: Residential Mobility in Gentrifying 
 Neighborhoods." Urban Affairs Review 40 (2005): 463-491. 
 
Freeman, Lance. There Goes the 'Hood: Views of Gentrification from the Ground Up.   
 Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2006. 
 
Gates, R. Le, and C. Hartman. “Displacement.” The Clearinghouse Review (1981): 207-
 249. 
 
Ginther, Donna, Robert Haveman, and Barbara Wolfe. “Neighborhood Attributes as 
 Determinants of Children’s Outcomes.” The Journal of Human Resources 35.4 
 (2000): 603-642.  
 
Gould Ellen, Ingrid and Margery A. Turner. “Do Neighborhoods Matter and Why?” In 
 John Goering and Judith Feins (Eds.), Choosing a Better Life. Washington, DC: 
 Urban Institute Press, 2003. 
 
HUD. Residential Displacement—an Update: Report to the Congress. Washington, D.C.: 
 U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development 
 and Research, 1981. 
 
Jencks, Christopher, and Susan Mayer. “The Social Consequences of Growing Up in a 
 Poor Neighborhood.” In Laurence E Lynn and Michael G.H. McGreary (Eds.), 
 Inner City Poverty in the United States. Pp. 111-86. Washington, DC: National 
 Academy Press, 1990. 
 
 44 
Kent, Adam D. “Did the Kentucky Reform Act (KERA) Reduce Residential Income 
 Segregation Across School Districts?” Saint Paul, MN: Macalester College, 2008. 
 
Kleit, Rachel Garshik. “The Role of Neighborhood Networks in Scattered-Site Public 
 Housing Residents’ Search for Jobs.” Housing Policy Debate 123 (2001): 541-73. 
 
Larsen, Henrik Gutzon, and Anders Lund Hansen. "Gentrification Gentle or Traumatic? 
 Urban Renewal Policies and Socioeconomic Transformations in Copenhagen." 
 Urban Studies 45 (2008): 2429-2448. 
 
Lees, Loretta, Tom Slater, and Elvin K. Wyly. Gentrification. New York: 
 Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2008. 
 
Lyons, Michal. "Gentrification, Socioeconomic Change, and the Geography of 
 Displacement." Journal of Urban Affairs 18 (1996): 39-62. 
Niedt, Christopher. “Gentrification and the Grassroots: Popular Support in the Revanchist 
 Suburb.” Journal of Urban Affairs 28.2 (2006): 99-120.  
Schill, Michael H. and Richard P. Nathan. Revitalizing America’s Cities: Neighborhood 
 Reinvestment and Displacement.” Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1983. 
South, Scott J., Kyle Crowder, and Erick Chavez. "Exiting and Entering High-Poverty 
 Neighborhoods: Latinos, Blacks and Anglos Compared." Social Forces 84.2 
 (2005): 873-900.  
Vigdor, J. “Does Gentrification Harm the Poor?” Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban 
 Affairs (2002): 133-173. 
 
Wilson, William J. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public 
 Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
 
Wyly, Elvin K., and Daniel J. Hammel. "Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal: Housing 
 Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification." Housing Policy Debate 10.4 (1999): 
 711-71.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45 
TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
 
 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
